top of page

A Winning Strategy for Ukraine, the U.S. and Allies Includes a Military Response

  • Writer: IPG
    IPG
  • Feb 24, 2022
  • 8 min read

Updated: Dec 14, 2023

Ajsha Pllana, International Politics Group www.internationalpoliticsgroup.com


ree

Alexey Nikolsky/SPUTNIK/AFP via Getty Images


The invasion of eastern Ukraine by Russian forces comes to many as no surprise. The White House has released troves of information warning of an imminent invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces in a persistent manner over the past couple of months. It has been slightly suspicious, and difficult to understand the motives of the Biden Administration revealing classified information in such a public manner. The White House has overtly revealed that the United States is capable of obtaining classified information from the Kremlin and seemingly wants to make this known to Russia and to the world. Indeed, speculations by the White House have turned out to be correct, and Russia’s “peacekeeping forces” have invaded separatist-back regions of eastern Ukraine. Yesterday, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a full-scale invasion of Ukraine for the “demilitarization and denazification” of the country. The new announcement came with a stark warning from Putin:

“To anyone who would consider interfering from the outside: if you do, you will face consequences greater than any of you have faced in history. All relevant decisions have been taken. I hope you hear me.”

Peacekeeping operations

These “peacekeeping” operations are, of course, a deceptive tactic used by Russia in an attempt to diplomatically satisfy democratic norms created by the West. It is a tale as old as time and the scheme goes something like this: an uprising is staged by Russians living in Ukraine, giving the Russian military the green light to cross the Ukrainian border in order to avoid backlash from the West. Similar strategies were used by Serbia, a key Russian ally in Europe, following the uncoupling of Yugoslavia. In the 1990’s Serbia sought to take complete control over each federation and autonomous region within Yugoslavia. Again, last month, separatists in the Republika Srpska, one of the two entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina chanted for the creation of a “Greater Serbia'' by not only dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina territory but also called for the annexation of Kosova, and parts of Croatia. What is chilling about the January Serbian nationalist celebration in Banja Luka is that in attendance were Chinese and Russian diplomats, as well as members of Marie Le Pen’s far-right political party, The National Rally. Putin has also received praise, namely from former U.S. President Donald Trump calling him a “genius” for launching attacks in eastern Ukraine.

Speculations of Russia’s game in the Balkans is not something new. Putin’s ambition for a greater global influence has been in the works for more than a decade now. In Montenegro, Russian military operatives orchestrated an assassination attempt of the then-Prime Minister Milo Đukanović to overthrow a pro-Western government, all in hopes of halting Montenegro’s NATO bid.

Putin is following in the footsteps of Slobodan Milosevic, who used the same strategy to legitimize his invasion of Kosova in the 1990s, via fabrication of alleged attacks on the country's Serb ethnic minority population by the Kosovar-Albanians in Kosova. These events should serve as a warning of the dangers of human rights violations and territorial integrity that Ukraine may continue to face. The potential of setting new illiberal international norms is dangerously high, undoing decades of global democratic advancements. Mark Twain remarked, "History doesn't repeat itself, but it often rhymes."

Are smart sanctions really that smart?

The United States and the European Union have begun imposing targeted, smart sanctions against Kremlin leaders, and both U.S. and French foreign ministers have canceled meetings with Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov. Further waves of sanctions are expected to roll out as the week continues. In a shocking turn of events, Germany – Russia’s biggest gas customer – has halted the certification of Nord Stream 2, a pipeline that could be worth as much as $15 billion to Gazprom, a Russian state-owned company. It is not a coincidence that Russian forces invaded Ukraine in the middle of winter. Many European nations are dependent upon Russia’s gas for power generation and home heating, which accounts for approximately 35% to 40% of Europe’s imported natural gas, according to reports. Even Hitler’s forces succumbed to the winter when he attacked Russia. It was a failure of imagination that led to his demise in Russia. His military would not be able to survive the cold winters sans proper and meticulous preparation. Russia understands that Ukraine and many other European nations are vulnerable during the winter months and less likely to retaliate against Russia.

The sanctions have been imposed, but the extent of the pressure applied seems surprising to Russia. The discontinuation of the Nord Stream 2 seems to come as a surprise to Russia because Germany has long maintained a neutral stance as a result of this project. This is a good indication of the West’s reaction to Russia’s recent powerplay and indicative of Ukraine receiving the support it desperately needs during this time. However it must be noted that sanctions alone are not enough, and a military strategy is necessary to facilitate the withdrawal of Russian forces out of Ukraine.

Let us be clear, targeted financial sanctions are a definite requirement. In a recent interview at the 2022 Munich Security Conference, General David Petraeus humorously recalled a conversation with his boss during the invasion of Iraq, when the U.S. military successfully took over the city of Najaf. He said, “I called my boss and told him I have good news and I have bad news. The good news is that we own Najaf, the bad news is that we own Najaf. What do you want us to do with it?” Russia may be facing a similar dichotomy, having invaded Donetsk and Luhansk, and today announcing plans to expand its reach to a full-scale invasion. Of course, Russia also annexed Crimea in 2014. The invasion may have been the easy part, whilst maintaining control of the regions may prove to be challenging. Sustaining control of the newly acquired regions may prove to be costly should Ukraine, with the support of the West, militarily challenge Russian forces. The Kremlin largely predicted sanctions would follow the invasion, as it is reported that Russia brought in $5 billion in foreign cash in December 2021 ahead of the invasion and anticipated sanctions. Russia and the West both understand that targeted sanctions are effective measures to deter a further invasion of Ukraine. But history tells us that financial sanctions are not enough. $5 billion dollars in cash should also quickly dissipate, especially if Russian forces are challenged. A winning strategy to successfully force the Russian military to retreat back to Moscow would require military capabilities.

Take Syria for example, a war that was heavily influenced by Russia. The Syrian War cost the U.S. and allies trillions of dollars. In addition, the U.S. and E.U. heavily sanctioned Assad’s Administration. Despite the enormous spending and the targeted sanctions, Syria manifested as one of the worst humanitarian disasters of the past century. More than half of the country, or nearly 14 million civilians remain displaced and Syria has suffered nearly 400,000 civilian casualties. Syrian refugees lead the refugee and displacement numbers in current reports. Perhaps the worst outcome of the Syrian War is that Assad has been able to maintain power throughout the war. High spending and/or sanctions alone are not enough to make or break a war. Funding, or lack thereof, is certainly a major contributing factor, but capable military action to complement targeted sanctions is most likely the decisive factor.

Consequences of failing to militarily intervene

In Syria, President Obama pushed for a humanitarian military intervention but having served as a Constitutional Law professor, he committed to the belief that the U.S. Constitution did not permit a President to enter into war without the approval of Congress unless faced with an imminent attack on the nation. President Obama failed to obtain authorization from Congress to militarily intervene in Syria. He turned to European allies, with the hopes of obtaining enough support for a multilateral intervention. He failed to do so, mainly due to the lack of support from the United Kingdom. Due to the lack of support from the United States Congress and European allies, he failed to act in Syria, despite his famous “red line” comment. As a result, Assad, with the help of Russia and Iran, was able to maintain the status quo. Syria and Russia’s forces were not necessarily more capable, rather it would be more accurate to say that Syrian and Russian forces remained largely unchallenged. This resulted in the “escalating stalemate” in which the Russian-backed Syrian forces acted just enough to stay afloat and succeeded because the West did not provide a sufficient military challenge. Syria is known as President Obama’s greatest failure, and should serve as a case study for President Biden.


A winning strategy includes sanctions, military aid, and increased troop presence by the U.S., U.K. and NATO

In the case of Ukraine, targeted, smart sanctions must be coupled with a capable military strategy in order to successfully compel Russian forces to retreat. The Bosnian War lasted four long years because it was mainly dealt with through diplomatic efforts, with the Dayton Accord famously ending the war. Yet in Kosova, the U.S.-led NATO humanitarian military intervention ended the war in a matter of three months. As soon as the NATO bombings began, the Serbian “Peacekeepers” in Kosova retreated back to Serbia, and voila, there was peace again.

One important factor to remember is that Russia is not necessarily one of the strongest militaries and it is not one of the wealthiest countries in the world. Harvard economist and former Obama Administration advisor, Jason Furman recently said that Russia is “basically a big gas station” and otherwise “incredibly unimportant” to the global economy. Russia is audacious and willing to initiate military conflicts. There is a great probability that its victories only arise because it goes largely unchallenged. Keeping in line with the just war theory, a proportionate response from the West need not be necessarily great. Furman noted that Russia’s economy is closer to Brazil, Italy and South Korea rather than nations like Germany and the UK. In comparison to the U.S., just the state of Texas alone surpasses Russia’s total GDP by more than 25%, putting a new perspective on “everything is bigger in Texas.” The “big gas station” comment does reverberate – Russia supplies the majority of natural gas used by the European Union. Certainly, Europe will have to find a new way forward when it comes to power generation and home heating much earlier than the anticipated 2030 deadline set forth by the European Commission. However, allowing Russia to go unchallenged in Ukraine may prove even more costly down the road; it seems that it is the lesser of two evils. Failing to dispute Russia’s actions now will create a dangerous precedent, which may be used by the Kremlin to invade Belarus and Finland in the future. China may also use this precedent to invade Taiwan. The West must take into consideration what all of these predicaments will mean to the global economy and trade regulations.

One important distinction between aiding Ukraine militarily vis-à-vis Syria is that Syria had thousands of armed groups and non-state actors that severely violated democratic processes and human rights. They also lacked organizational abilities. Ukraine on the other hand, has a national military which already receives U.S. aid. Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has a great deal of support, especially recently, and most Ukrainians present a united front.

The winning strategy for preventing the spread of Russian invasion in Ukraine would be a multilateral effort by Ukraine, NATO and the U.S. and U.K. to employ smart and targeted sanctions whilst employing military action to force Russia to retreat back to Moscow. Ramping up military aid to bolster Ukrainian forces by the U.S., the U.K. and NATO, could greatly contribute to the nation’s ability to protect its borders against the Russian forces. The U.S. and Allies should also increase troop presence in Ukraine to deter Russian forces from engaging in hostile acts and be prepared to respond if necessary.

The E.U. and NATO should also strategize to have Ukraine matriculated into NATO in a speedy process. A swift and effective response would be one that initiates Ukraine’s NATO membership, perhaps with neighboring nations such as Finland and Belarus. Russia’s bordering neighbors such as Finland and Ukraine have not joined NATO to avoid angering Russia. But that hasn’t helped them so far, and it seems the time has come for these nations to help themselves. On the other hand, the E.U. needs to prioritize unifying against aggressive behavior from Russia and China by accepting nations in east and south Europe without prejudice into both the E.U. and NATO. The danger that may come from allowing these vulnerable nations to fall prey to Russia and China far outweigh any economic prerequisites and concerns enumerated by the E.U. for joining the Union and NATO.

It is time to acknowledge Russia as an aggressive actor, rather than an actor that may become aggressive in the future. This profound understanding should be the foundation on which policy development is built upon for Ukraine and neighboring states.


 
 
 

Comments


©Copyright 2025 by IPG

bottom of page